Our first story of 2026 revealed how a damaging new botnet known as Kimwolf has contaminated greater than two million gadgets by mass-compromising an unlimited variety of unofficial Android TV streaming packing containers. Right this moment, we’ll dig by digital clues left behind by the hackers, community operators and providers that seem to have benefitted from Kimwolf’s unfold.
On Dec. 17, 2025, the Chinese language safety agency XLab revealed a deep dive on Kimwolf, which forces contaminated gadgets to take part in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) assaults and to relay abusive and malicious Web site visitors for so-called “residential proxy” providers.
The software program that turns one’s system right into a residential proxy is usually quietly bundled with cellular apps and video games. Kimwolf particularly focused residential proxy software program that’s manufacturing facility put in on greater than a thousand completely different fashions of unsanctioned Android TV streaming gadgets. In a short time, the residential proxy’s Web deal with begins funneling site visitors that’s linked to advert fraud, account takeover makes an attempt and mass content material scraping.
The XLab report defined its researchers discovered “definitive proof” that the identical cybercriminal actors and infrastructure had been used to deploy each Kimwolf and the Aisuru botnet — an earlier model of Kimwolf that additionally enslaved gadgets to be used in DDoS assaults and proxy providers.
XLab stated it suspected since October that Kimwolf and Aisuru had the identical creator(s) and operators, primarily based partly on shared code modifications over time. However it stated these suspicions had been confirmed on December 8 when it witnessed each botnet strains being distributed by the identical Web deal with at 93.95.112[.]59.
Picture: XLab.
RESI RACK
Public information present the Web deal with vary flagged by XLab is assigned to Lehi, Utah-based Resi Rack LLC. Resi Rack’s web site payments the corporate as a “Premium Recreation Server Internet hosting Supplier.” In the meantime, Resi Rack’s adverts on the Web moneymaking discussion board BlackHatWorld discuss with it as a “Premium Residential Proxy Internet hosting and Proxy Software program Options Firm.”
Resi Rack co-founder Cassidy Hales informed KrebsOnSecurity his firm obtained a notification on December 10 about Kimwolf utilizing their community “that detailed what was being carried out by one among our clients leasing our servers.”
“Once we obtained this e-mail we took care of this difficulty instantly,” Hales wrote in response to an e-mail requesting remark. “That is one thing we’re very upset is now related to our identify and this was not the intention of our firm in anyway.”
The Resi Rack Web deal with cited by XLab on December 8 got here onto KrebsOnSecurity’s radar greater than two weeks earlier than that. Benjamin Brundage is founding father of Synthient, a startup that tracks proxy providers. In late October 2025, Brundage shared that the individuals promoting numerous proxy providers which benefitted from the Aisuru and Kimwolf botnets had been doing so at a brand new Discord server known as resi[.]to.
On November 24, 2025, a member of the resi-dot-to Discord channel shares an IP deal with answerable for proxying site visitors over Android TV streaming packing containers contaminated by the Kimwolf botnet.
When KrebsOnSecurity joined the resi[.]to Discord channel in late October as a silent lurker, the server had fewer than 150 members, together with “Shox” — the nickname utilized by Resi Rack’s co-founder Mr. Hales — and his enterprise accomplice “Linus,” who didn’t reply to requests for remark.
Different members of the resi[.]to Discord channel would periodically publish new IP addresses that had been answerable for proxying site visitors over the Kimwolf botnet. Because the screenshot from resi[.]to above exhibits, that Resi Rack Web deal with flagged by XLab was utilized by Kimwolf to direct proxy site visitors way back to November 24, if not earlier. All informed, Synthient stated it tracked at the very least seven static Resi Rack IP addresses related to Kimwolf proxy infrastructure between October and December 2025.
Neither of Resi Rack’s co-owners responded to follow-up questions. Each have been energetic in promoting proxy providers through Discord for practically two years. Based on a assessment of Discord messages listed by the cyber intelligence agency Flashpoint, Shox and Linus spent a lot of 2024 promoting static “ISP proxies” by routing numerous Web deal with blocks at main U.S. Web service suppliers.
In February 2025, AT&T introduced that efficient July 31, 2025, it could now not originate routes for community blocks that aren’t owned and managed by AT&T (different main ISPs have since made comparable strikes). Lower than a month later, Shox and Linus informed clients they might quickly stop providing static ISP proxies on account of these coverage modifications.
Shox and Linux, speaking about their determination to cease promoting ISP proxies.
DORT & SNOW
The said proprietor of the resi[.]to Discord server glided by the abbreviated username “D.” That preliminary seems to be quick for the hacker deal with “Dort,” a reputation that was invoked steadily all through these Discord chats.
Dort’s profile on resi dot to.
This “Dort” nickname got here up in KrebsOnSecurity’s current conversations with “Forky,” a Brazilian man who acknowledged being concerned within the advertising of the Aisuru botnet at its inception in late 2024. However Forky vehemently denied having something to do with a sequence of large and record-smashing DDoS assaults within the latter half of 2025 that had been blamed on Aisuru, saying the botnet by that time had been taken over by rivals.
Forky asserts that Dort is a resident of Canada and one among at the very least two people presently in charge of the Aisuru/Kimwolf botnet. The opposite particular person Forky named as an Aisuru/Kimwolf botmaster goes by the nickname “Snow.”
On January 2 — simply hours after our story on Kimwolf was revealed — the historic chat information on resi[.]to had been erased with out warning and changed by a profanity-laced message for Synthient’s founder. Minutes after that, your entire server disappeared.
Later that very same day, a number of of the extra energetic members of the now-defunct resi[.]to Discord server moved to a Telegram channel the place they posted Brundage’s private data, and usually complained about being unable to seek out dependable “bulletproof” internet hosting for his or her botnet.
Hilariously, a consumer by the identify “Richard Remington” briefly appeared within the group’s Telegram server to publish a crude “Completely satisfied New Yr” sketch that claims Dort and Snow at the moment are in charge of 3.5 million gadgets contaminated by Aisuru and/or Kimwolf. Richard Remington’s Telegram account has since been deleted, however it beforehand said its proprietor operates a web site that caters to DDoS-for-hire or “stresser” providers looking for to check their firepower.
BYTECONNECT, PLAINPROXIES, AND 3XK TECH
Reviews from each Synthient and XLab discovered that Kimwolf was used to deploy packages that turned contaminated techniques into Web site visitors relays for a number of residential proxy providers. Amongst these was a part that put in a software program growth package (SDK) known as ByteConnect, which is distributed by a supplier generally known as Plainproxies.
ByteConnect says it focuses on “monetizing apps ethically and free,” whereas Plainproxies advertises the flexibility to supply content material scraping firms with “limitless” proxy swimming pools. Nevertheless, Synthient stated that upon connecting to ByteConnect’s SDK they as a substitute noticed a mass inflow of credential-stuffing assaults concentrating on e-mail servers and widespread on-line web sites.
A search on LinkedIn finds the CEO of Plainproxies is Friedrich Kraft, whose resume says he’s co-founder of ByteConnect Ltd. Public Web routing information present Mr. Kraft additionally operates a internet hosting agency in Germany known as 3XK Tech GmbH. Mr. Kraft didn’t reply to repeated requests for an interview.
In July 2025, Cloudflare reported that 3XK Tech (a.ok.a. Drei-Okay-Tech) had change into the Web’s largest supply of application-layer DDoS assaults. In November 2025, the safety agency GreyNoise Intelligence discovered that Web addresses on 3XK Tech had been answerable for roughly three-quarters of the Web scanning being carried out on the time for a newly found and important vulnerability in safety merchandise made by Palo Alto Networks.
Supply: Cloudflare’s Q2 2025 DDoS menace report.
LinkedIn has a profile for an additional Plainproxies worker, Julia Levi, who’s listed as co-founder of ByteConnect. Ms. Levi didn’t reply to requests for remark. Her resume says she beforehand labored for 2 main proxy suppliers: Netnut Proxy Community, and Vivid Information.
Synthient likewise stated Plainproxies ignored their outreach, noting that the Byteconnect SDK continues to stay energetic on gadgets compromised by Kimwolf.
A publish from the LinkedIn web page of Plainproxies Chief Income Officer Julia Levi, explaining how the residential proxy enterprise works.
MASKIFY
Synthient’s January 2 report stated one other proxy supplier closely concerned within the sale of Kimwolf proxies was Maskify, which presently advertises on a number of cybercrime boards that it has greater than six million residential Web addresses for lease.
Maskify costs its service at a fee of 30 cents per gigabyte of information relayed by their proxies. Based on Synthient, that worth vary is insanely low and is much cheaper than every other proxy supplier in enterprise as we speak.
“Synthient’s Analysis Crew obtained screenshots from different proxy suppliers displaying key Kimwolf actors trying to dump proxy bandwidth in alternate for upfront money,” the Synthient report famous. “This method possible helped gas early growth, with related members spending earnings on infrastructure and outsourced growth duties. Please notice that resellers know exactly what they’re promoting; proxies at these costs will not be ethically sourced.”
Maskify didn’t reply to requests for remark.
The Maskify web site. Picture: Synthient.
BOTMASTERS LASH OUT
Hours after our first Kimwolf story was revealed final week, the resi[.]to Discord server vanished, Synthient’s web site was hit with a DDoS assault, and the Kimwolf botmasters took to doxing Brundage through their botnet.
The harassing messages appeared as textual content information uploaded to the Ethereum Title Service (ENS), a distributed system for supporting sensible contracts deployed on the Ethereum blockchain. As documented by XLab, in mid-December the Kimwolf operators upgraded their infrastructure and started utilizing ENS to higher stand up to the near-constant takedown efforts concentrating on the botnet’s management servers.
An ENS report utilized by the Kimwolf operators taunts safety corporations making an attempt to take down the botnet’s management servers. Picture: XLab.
By telling contaminated techniques to hunt out the Kimwolf management servers through ENS, even when the servers that the botmasters use to manage the botnet are taken down the attacker solely must replace the ENS textual content report to mirror the brand new Web deal with of the management server, and the contaminated gadgets will instantly know the place to search for additional directions.
“This channel itself depends on the decentralized nature of blockchain, unregulated by Ethereum or different blockchain operators, and can’t be blocked,” XLab wrote.
The textual content information included in Kimwolf’s ENS directions can even function quick messages, similar to people who carried Brundage’s private data. Different ENS textual content information related to Kimwolf provided some sage recommendation: “If flagged, we encourage the TV field to be destroyed.”
An ENS report tied to the Kimwolf botnet advises, “If flagged, we encourage the TV field to be destroyed.”
Each Synthient and XLabs say Kimwolf targets an unlimited variety of Android TV streaming field fashions, all of which have zero safety protections, and plenty of of which ship with proxy malware in-built. Usually talking, if you happen to can ship a knowledge packet to one among these gadgets you may as well seize administrative management over it.
If you happen to personal a TV field that matches one among these mannequin names and/or numbers, please simply rip it out of your community. If you happen to encounter one among these gadgets on the community of a member of the family or good friend, ship them a hyperlink to this story (or to our January 2 story on Kimwolf) and clarify that it’s not well worth the potential trouble and hurt created by maintaining them plugged in.
